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PART I
INTRODUCTION
The body of water between the southern tip of Alaska's
panhandle and British Columbia's Queen Charlotte Islands, known as
Dixon Entrance, is one of four external maritime boundaries between
the United States and Canada. (See Figure I-I) This particular
boundary has been an area of dispute ever since it was established
and settlement does not appear to be imminent. Yet, this dispute
continues to create poor management of fish stocks, trade disruption,
feelings of frustration among fishermen of both nations, and in
general, it remains a thorn in the side of United States-Canadian
relations.
In this paper I intend to review the history behind the disputed
area, the issues involved, the positions of each nation, and the
applicable international law. I will examine the various options
available to the United States and Canada. I will then place myself In
the unenviable position of arbitor and propose a solution to this long
lasting boundary dispute.
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PART II
HISTORY
The history of the struggle between the United States and Canada
for fishing rights in the area of Dixon Entrance is both long and
complex. The struggle began with the occupation of territory in the
northern Pacific by Russians exploiting the fur resources. Disputes
over the occupied territory involved the countries of Great Britain,
the United States, Canada, and Russia. As the present claims of
Canada rely heavily on the history of Dixon Entrance; a review of this
history is necessary in order to examine the validity of these claims.
A. EARLY COLONIZATION
In 1732, a Russian fleet landed in Alaska and attempted to annex
the country to the Russian Empire. But, it wasn't until 1741, when
the famed Danish explorer, Vitus Bering, discovered and charted
much of Alaska that true Russian occupation began. Although Bering
never returned to Russia (he was shipwrecked and died in the
Aleutian Islands), his fleet returned with reports of the rich fur
resources that they had found throughout Alaska. As furs were In
great demand in China, these reports opened a floodgate of Russian
3
trappers, sealers, and traders seeking wealth In Alaska'! Thus,
Russia acquired title to the land in this part of the world through
discovery, occupation, and ultimately, settlement.
From the 1760's to the 1780's, the British had their own explorer,
Captain James Cook, mapping and surveying the North Pacific. In the
1790's, a former member of Cook's crew, Captain George Vancouver,
mapped and surveyed the Pacific coast of North America. At the
same time, a British trader and explorer for the North-West Fur
Company, Alexander Mackenzie, crossed overland from Great Slave
Lake. He passed through the northern Rocky Mountains and reached
the Pacific Ocean at about 52°N latitude having traveled through
what is now Canada's British Columbia. Shortly after the turn of the
century, President Jefferson of the United States secretly dispatched
his explorers, Merriweather Lewis and William Clark, to the Pacific
Northwest thus laying claim to a portion of the Pacific Northwest in
the vicinity of the Columbia River.Z This set the stage for a territorial
dispute between Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada.
B. TIIE FUR TRADE
The British and American teams wrote extensive reports of their
journeys spawning a wave of fur traders to the area, most of which
were Yankee traders from New England. British ships and traders,
1 Gordon Ireland, Boundaries. Possessions. and Conflicts in Central and North
America and the Caribbean, (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), p. 290.
2 Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1972), p. 2.
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too, flooded the area, but the ship's were withdrawn during the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars leaving behind only their
land based fur traders.3 British, American, and Russian citizens
were now competing in the fur trade of the North Pacific in an effort
to meet the demands of China.
The Russians occupied much of the northern Pacific, where the fur
supply was the greatest, by means of heavily fortified trading posts.
Competition among the Russian companies was great and in 1799,
the Russian Emperor Paul issued an Ukase (edict) granting the
Russian-American Company (an exclusively Russian company despite
its name) a monopoly throughout the northern Pacific from Asia to
America and north of 55°N latitude. In return for the exclusive
economic rights, the Russian-American Company was required to
support the Russian Orthodox Church and encourage shipbuilding and
agriculture throughout the region. Although foreign nations were not
informed of the Ukase, none of them protested against the scope or
the exercise of the Russian-American Company's powers. The
Russian government later interpreted the silence of other nations as
"tacit consent" to their claims over this territory in the North Pacific.s
A Russian by the name of Alexander Baranof led the Russian-
American Company through a period of great prosperity during this
time. But, although the company was successful, it relied heavily on
materials from its homeland to support its operations. Thus, in 1812,
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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Baranof established Fort Ross, eighty miles north of San Francisco, to
resupply his North Pacific bases. From 1815 to 1818, he even
attempted to gain a foothold in the Hawaiian Islands, without
success. Later, Baranof was supplied by American bases in the
Columbia River Basin.>
Aside from reprovisromng the Russian trading posts, the greatest
threat came from the small Yankee traders (vessels of 100-250 tons)
which moved in on the Russian venture. By trading guns and
whiskey to the native Aleuts, the Yankee vessels shipped large
amounts of furs directly to the Chinese city of Canton. The Russians,
on the other hand, were required "by some strange caprice of the
Chinese"6 to transport their furs overland from Siberia.
The Russian government naturally protested to the American
government the intrusion of its vessels into the area of Russian trade.
The American government rejected the protest on the grounds that
"the law of nations permitted trade in unsettled areas" but the
Russians soon dropped the protest due to the threat of Napoleon's
advances toward their homeland."
After 1815, the Russian-American Company fell into economic
decline due to the trade restrictions, resupply difficulties, and the
5 Ibid., p. 3.
6 Proceedings of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal, (58th Congress, 2nd Session:
Senate Document Number 162), p. 77, quoted in Norman Penlington, The Alaska
Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, p. 3.
7 Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, p. 3.
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reduction of the stocks of fur bearing animals. In an attempt to
salvage the company, the Russian Emperor again issued an Ukase In
September 1821. This Ukase extended the previous Ukase by
reserving to Russian subjects "the pursuits of commerce, whaling and
fishery, and all other industry" on the islands and coasts of North
America south to 51oN latitude. It also prohibited foreign vessels
from approaching within 100 Italian miles of the coast.f Through
the Ukase, the Russian government attempted to completely shut off
the Yankee traders. Both great Britain and the United States
protested this extension of jurisdiction and attempted to have the
Ukase withdrawn.
C. THE RUSSIAN-A:MERICAN AND ANGLO-RUSSIAN TREATIES
On the surface, both the protests of the United States and Great
Britain appeared alike. The United States Secretary of State, John
Quincy Adams, protested the Russian's violation of the freedom of
the seas for he knew full well that the Yankee traders would fight for
the right for free trade in the North Pacific. He also argued that the
Russians had no basis for a claim as far south as 51"N latitude. The
British also protested the Russian's claim to 100 miles as well as all
territorial claims on the American continent.?
8 C. B. Bourne and D. M. McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance:
The Alaska Boundary Re-Examined," Canadian Yearbook of International Law,
1976, p. 179. An Italian mile is equal to 6085.2 feet.
9 Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, p. 4.
7
The Americans and British initially planned to negotiate against
the Ukase of 1821 together. Representatives from both countries
were given the power to negotiate the treaty in St Petersburg (now
Leningrad). The British negotiator was Sir Charles Bagot, a former
Minister to the United States, and the United States appointed Henry
Middleton, a former state governor, representative to Congress, and
Minister to Russia.' 0
But, behind the scenes, things were different. Secretary Adams
proposed to Stratford Canning, the British Minister at Washington,
that they proceed in joint Anglo-American negotiations with Russia
modelled after the Anglo-American Convention of 1818. The 1818
Convention had laid down the boundary between British and
American territories along the 49th parallel of the American
Continent to the Rocky Mountains. The area west of the Rocky
Mountains, however, was subject to the open occupation limits of the
"Oregon territory." This resulted in the American advantage when
the United States, four months later (in the treaty of 1819), obtained
the Spanish territory along the Pacific coast north of 42°N latitude.
Secretary Adams had used both the treaties of 1818 and 1819 to
further the territory of the United States all the way to the Pacific
coast. His strategy this time was to play the British and Russians
against each other in a tripartite negotiation which, he hoped, would
benefit the United States. 11
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid .• pp. 4-5.
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Stratford Canning's cousin, George Canning, was at this time the
British Foreign Minister who's VIews on imperialism, nationalism, and
a great Oregon-Orient trade were loosing popularity. British policy
was shifting toward free trade and anti-imperialism. Although
Stratford Canning proposed to his cousin George the acceptance of the
American proposal for joint negotiations, George was concerned that
the Americans would take advantage of the British in territory
considerations. Even though Secretary Adams claimed that United
States territorial interests did not extend north of the 51st parallel
(the Russian boundary claim), George Canning was concerned that the
Americans would attempt to gain the Pacific Territory between the
49th parallel and the 51st parallel. He was also concerned that the
Russians would take advantage of Anglo-American differences to
further the Russian position.t ?
When George Canning later learned that the United States position
was to claim not just north to 51 "N latitude but to 55°N latitude, he
was greatly angered. The issue became further heated with the
arrival of the Monroe Doctrine which stated that "the American
continents... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for
further colonization by any European power." 13 The British Foreign
Security thus sent instructions to Sir Charles Bagot, the British
representative at the negotiations in St Petersburg, not to combine
his negotiations with the Americans and to complete his negotiations
12 Ibid.• p. 5.
13 Ibid.• p. 6.
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with the Russians pnor to the United States.i s Canning had
suspected that Adams intended to gratify Russia at the expense of
British land territory and gratify the British at the expense of
Russian sea territory. He had been correct.U
American negotiations with the Russians proceeded quickly. The
Russians paid no heed to the Monroe Doctrine and proposed a
settlement based on the" mutual interest of both countries. The
United States representative, Henry Middleton, agreed to recognize
the separation of Russian and American zones or "spheres of
influence" at 54°-40'N. In return, Russia agreed to give up its
maritime exclusion and agreed on a ten year provision whereby each
of the other countries could fish and trade in the other's zone.If On
February 28, 1824, the Treaty between the United States and Russia
relative to Navigation, Fishing, and Trading in the Pacific Ocean and
to Establishments on the Northwest coast was completed. Article I
probibited the formation of American settlements north of the 54°-
40'N parallel and Article III prohibited the Russians from
establishing settlements south of the 54°-40'N line. Article IV
allowed ships of both nations to frequent "interior seas, gulfs,
harbours, and creeks, upon the coast...for the purpose of fishing and
14 Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The
Alaska Boundary Re-Examined," p. 180 and Penlington, The Alaska Boundary
Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, p. 7.
15 Penlington , The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, p. 6.
16 Ibid., p. 8-9.
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trading with the natives of the country" for ten years.! 7 This 54°-
40'N parallel passes through Dixon Entrance. (See Figure II-I)
Great Britain had more at stake in the negotiations than access to
the coast. The British government was concerned with the status of
the islands along the coast as well as the delimitation of the land
between Russia and Great Britain on the mainland. Bagot was
unsuccessful in his negotiations with the Russians. He attempted to
push the British position as far north as 59°N latitude. When the
Russians wouldn't budge, he proceeded to propose boundary limits
further south, but pushed the Russian claim closer to the coast. He
was unsuccessful in resolving the dispute and was eventually
replaced by George Canning's cousin Stratford Canning.If
The Anglo-Russian Treaty was finally signed on February 16,
1825. This treaty provided the same rights of citizens of each nation
to fish in the Pacific Ocean as the Russian-American Treaty had but it
also provided for a more detailed description of land territorial
boundaries. Article VII of the 1825 Treaty not only provided the
right of access to the "inland seas, the gulfs, havens, and creeks, on
the coast" but it also gave the right to navigate the rivers and
streams that flow from British territory into Russian territory to
British subjects in perpetui ty ,19 This treaty virtually settled the
17 Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The
Alaska Boundary Re-Examined," p. 180. The ten year provision was never
renewed.
18 Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, pp. 7-10.
19 Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The
Alaska Boundary Re-Examined," pp. 180-181.
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differences between Russia and Great Britain but new players were
soon to arrive on the scene,
D. THE UNITED STATES PURCHASES ALASKA
On March 30, 1867, after three weeks of secret negotiations,
United States Secretary of States William H. Seward and the Russian
Minister to the United, States Baron Edouard de Stoeckl, signed the
Treaty of Cession of Russian America. In exchange for $7,200,000 in
gold, the United States received all Russian territory in the Americas.
This modest sum, by today's standards, purchased 590,884 square
miles of land with a coastline of 26,376 miles.20 Even before the
Russians received payment, the territory was officially taken over by
the United States. President Andrew Johnson appointed general
Jefferson C. Davis to command a military force of 500 men to be
stationed throughout the territory and he appointed General Lovell
H. Rousseau to act as the commissioner for the ceremonies held in
Sitka on August 12, 1868. 2 1
It was in this way that the United States became a party to the
Treaty of 1825 formerly held between the Russians and the British.
The Treaty of Cession defined the boundaries of the purchase by
quoting Articles of the 1825 treaty. (See Figure 11-2) In 1871,
British Columbia entered the Confederation and Canada acquired an
20 Ireland, Boundaries. Possessions. and Conflicts in Central and North
America and the Caribbean, p. 291.
21 Claus-M. Naske, An Interpretive History of Alaskan Statehood, (Anchorage:
Alaska Northwest Publishing Company, 1973), p. 1.
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interest in the treaty.22 But, the panhandle boundary issue
remained untouched until economic considerations brought it to a
head.
The narrow strip of Alaska that extends down from the main
body is well forested with thick undergrowth and plentiful rivers.
Fish, especially salmon, and fur-bearing animals abound. Initially,
economic interests in the panhandle were strictly in the fur trade.
However, the decline in the seal and whale populations caused a
transfer of interest to the salmon fishing industry. By 1880, several
large companies controlled the fishing industry and a large cannery
had been established on Prince of Wales Island.23
This area of the North American continent is also rich in gold
deposits. When gold was discovered in the northern Cassier District
of British Columbia in 1872, pressure for a boundary settlement
increased. During this time, Canada was still a colony of Great Britain
and much of its political machinery, as well as external affairs,
remained under control of the parent nation. During that same year,
President Ulysses S. Grant recommended to Congress the
establishment of a joint U.S.-British commission to accurately
determine the boundary between the Alaska and British Columbia.
(See Figure 11-3) But Congress felt that the sparcity of population in
the area lessened the possibility of a border conflict plus the cost of a
22 John A. Munro. The Alaska Boundary Dispute. (Toronto: Copp Clark
Publishing Company. 1970). p. 1.
23 Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal. pp. 20-21.
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commission's study suggested the need for a settlement at the time
was not necessary. The gold reserves of the Cassier mountains were
beginning to dry up along with the pressure to resolve the issue of
the boundary; but, only for a short time!24
Gold, this time discovered in the Klondike in 1897, caused
relations between the United States and Canada to fester. Thousands
of miners set out for the new gold deposits and passage through the
panhandle was again necessary to reach the gold fields. Canada
expected British support for its contentions and had even sent a
contingent of troop to South Africa during the Boer War in a gesture
devised to earn British support in the Alaska boundary dispute.v>
Great Britain, although pleased by the Canadian assistance, felt a
"quid pro quo" unnecessary. In fact, Britain's policy become became
one of less interest in indulging in Canada's boundary extensions.
The Boer war had a devastating effect on on Britain's power and
shattered its prestige. Its naval power was weakened and it was
unable to maintain its position against nationalist and imperialist
challenges throughout the world.26 Britain warned Canada in 1899
that there was "a limit to Imperial Unity" and that in the light of
public opinion and its own national interests, it would not continue to
support "unreasonable boundary contentions. "27
E. THE ALASKA BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL
24 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
25 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
26 Ibid., p. 52.
27 Ibid., p. 50.
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On January 24, 1903, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay and the
British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Michael Herbert signed a
boundary convention which came to be known as the Hay-Herbert
Treaty. This treaty called for a tribunal to decide the Alaska
boundary question. The tribunal was to be made up of six impartial
jurists (three from the United States, two from Canada, and one from
Great Britain) to decide the panhandle boundary.28 Before being
passed by the U.S. Senate, the word "arbitral" was deleted with the
agreement of Sir Herbert. The change in wording had the effect of
transforming the tribunal from a body suggestive of arbitration to
one of purely diplomatic devices. Canada was not made aware of this
change.29
The Alaska Boundary Tribunal, with Lord Alverstone presiding,
sat in London to decide the dispute. On October 20, 1903, a majority
of the tribunal, consisting of the three U.S. representatives and Lord
Alverstone, agreed to establish (among other things) the boundary
beginning at Cape Muzon (a point on which the tribunal was
unanimous) on Dall Island running east in a straight line through
Dixon Entrance to the mouth of the Portland Channel, north of Wales
and Pearse Islands to the 56th parallel and then on on into the
mountains. 30 (See Figure 11-4) By drawing the line (which came to
be known as the A-B line) in such a way, the tribunal awarded the
28 Ibid., p. 68.
29 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
30 Ireland, Boundaries. Possessions. and Conflicts in Central and North
America and the Caribbean, p. 293.
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islands of Sitklan and Kannaghunut to the United States. (See Figure
11-5) The Canadians were outraged and accused Lord Alverstone of
selling out to the Americans) 1 Despite the outrage, however, the
land boundary between British Columbia and Alaska has remained
definitive. Yet the maritime boundary has increasingly come under
scrutiny. This area of dispute lies in Dixon Entrance. The question is,
was the line drawn between Cape Muzon and the Portland Channel
intended as a maritime boundary, or did it serve to simply divide the
land territories of the two nations?
F. TIIE MARITIME DISPUTE
There is no record of any discussion between Canada, Great
Britain, or the United States as to the legal status of the sea to the
north of the 1825 Treaty boundary. However, one particular
incident spurred the interest of the United States south of the
boundary line. In 1897, a Canadian Fisheries protection vessel
warned an American fishing vessel that "U.S. vessels are not allowed
to fish anywhere in Hecate Strait or in any other territorial waters of
the Province of British Columbia." This assertion of jurisdiction was
immediately protested by United States Secretary of State Sherman
in 1897 and, when no reply was received by Great Britain, was
protested again by Secretary of State Root in 1905. In 1909, a
similar action again by a Canadian Fisheries protection vessel
prompted the United States Department of State to request a formal
31 Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The
Alaska Boundary Re-Examined," p. 176.
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statement on the position of Great Britain on the question of fishing
rights in Hecate Strait.3 2
The U.S. request was forwarded by Great Britain to the Governor-
General of Canada for comment. A committee of the Privy Council of
Canada responded with an Order In Council asserting their right to
jurisdiction over both Hecate Strait and the waters of Dixon Entrance
"south of the line established by the Alaska Boundary Award of
1903." The Privy Council argues in its defense that, although it is
doubtful whether the framers of the Treaty of 1825 intended to
create a delimitation of the seas, the boundary tribunal, with regard
to its terms of reference, the questions it was asked, and the way it
drew the line, created "a boundary line separating territorial
possessions - water as well as land."33
The British government referred the Privy Council's report to
their law officers for review. The British government reported that,
although there were matters in Canada's favor, the opinion of the
Privy Council "can not be justified either by international law or by
treaty rights." They concluded that Dixon Entrance was considered
high seas and that if the tribunal had intended on making a decision
contrary to international law, it would have made that point
extremely clear.3 4
32 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
33 Ibid.• p. 177.
34 Documents on Canada's External Relations. Vol. 1, p. 412 cited in Bourne and
McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-
Examined." p. 178.
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In 1914,the Privy Council reaffirmed the Canadian position on the
waters of Hecate Strait and Dixon Entrance despite the arguments of
Great Britain. Although the matter was never taken up again
between Great Britain and the United States, Canada has continued to
assert its position. In 1971, an Order in Council in Canada drew
fisheries closing lines to include the waters of Dixon Entrance.J> (See
Figure 11-6) In 1973, the Canadian Bureau of Legal Affairs claimed
that although the Territorial Sea and Fishing Act (passed by Canada
in that year) lays no claim to sovereignty, "it does not bar a
subsequent claim to sovereignty on historic or other grounds.Jv The
United States, on the other hand, has continued to assert its fisheries
zone based on the equidistance method.I? (See Figure 11-7)
G. SUMMARY
The waters of Dixon Entrance have been the subject of
controversy for over 200 years and have involved the nations of
Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and Russia. Diplomatic
discussions, treaties, and behind the scenes politics have all shaped
the dispute as it exists today. Economics have played a big role in
35 Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The
Alaska Boundary Re-Examined," p. 178.
36 "Canadian Practice in International Law during 1973 as Reflected Mainly in
Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs," (1974)
12 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, p. 279 cited in Bourne and McRae,
"Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-
Examined," p. 178.
3? Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 44 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
March 7 1977), at 12938.
27
MAP' •."" ;'1, • • ;-·0\.
THE COXO", ENTRAl<Ce;:?..( '\~1 ~ •
- - COFlod.on (onc.pr of \.. ( ~ . 'y _ .
T"~ 'n'e rnOhOOOI ;r'\\. e,c:fI .
Boundary ; . J ;j \..,\~
- EQUldr\ton, LJniI ~ )~ _
' -9 :6 ,000
£NrRANC£
!l4'
.......
."
....
-...
", ' " 2 '
Figure 11-7 (Source: Cuyvers, "Maritime Boundaries: Canada vs.
United States)
28
bringing the Issue to the forefront. First, it was fur, then gold, and
now fishery resources. What is at stake now and what other treaties
govern the delimitation of boundaries? Part III will review the
resources at stake as well as the applicable international law.
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PART III
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
The body of water known as Dixon Entrance is a protected, deep
inlet along the northwest coast of North America. It is bordered to
the north principally by Prince of Wales Island and to the south by
Queen Charlotte Island. It allows access to Hecate Strait and
numerous rivers such as the Skeena, Nass, Sitikine, and the Portland
Channel.
Alaskan cities to the north include Ketchican, population 7,198,
Wrangell, population 2,184, and Metlakatla, population 1,100.
Canadian cities to the east and south include Prince Rupert,
population 16,197, and Kitimat, population 11,791. 1 The only access
to the Alaskan cities is via boat or plane where as the Canadian cities
have additional highway access. The Canadian cities are connected to
the Alaskan Highway (97) by way of state roads 16 and 37. (See
Figure 111-1 and 111-2)
The fisheries industry plays are large part in the boundary
dispute between the two nations today. But, what of the future?
The mountains are known to be rich in minerals; and what of the
1 1987 Road Atlas: United States. Canada, Mexico. (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 1987), pp. 120-198. Populations are based on the 1980 census or the
latest available estimates.
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Fi gure 111-1 (Source: 1987 Roed Atl es: The United Stetes, Cenede,
end Mexjco)
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seabed? Are the security interests of the two nations important In
this area? I intend to review these issues in an analysis of what is at
stake in the Dixon Entrance boundary dispute.
A. NATIONAL SECURITY
Although the land boundary that the United States and Canada
share remains completely unfortified, one incident nearly turned the
border into a battleground. During the Venezuela Incident of 1895-
96, the United States and Great Britain came to the verge of war over
the arbitration of the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary. Had the
two nations gone to war, the U.S. - Canadian border would have been
the battle line.2 Today, the United States and Canada are allies In
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and NORAD (North
American Defense) and share a concern for North American security.
This has not stopped the nations, however, from taking opposite
positions on issues of coastal jurisdiction.
When the Japanese occupied several islands in the Aleutian chain
during the Second World War, the American government, as well as
the citizens of the United States, suddenly realized Alaska's strategic
importance. Vast amounts of money and personnel were dispatched
to Alaska to counter the threat.3 As World War II ended and the
cold war began, U.S. security intrests turned towards the Soviet
Union, with whom Alaska shares another border.
2 Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, p.33.
3 Naske, An Interpretive History of Alaskan Statehood, p. ix.
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How does Dixon Entrance fit into the national security picture for
the Unites States and Canada? There has been some talk of placing a
U.S. Trident missile submarine base in the area.t A U.S. sea lane into
Dixon Entrance would be of primary interest to the United States so
that it could move its submarines in and out of port in U.S. waters.
In general, though, as long as both Canada and the United States are
members of NATO and share the same security concerns, there is
little possibility for conflict over the boundary within Dixon Entrance.
B. NON-LNING RESOURCES
Up till now, the central issues surrounding the Dixon Entrance
boundary dispute have been ones of sovereignty and fishing, not
seabed.f This is not to say that there are not seabed resources in
the area, only that they are not being exploited at the present time.
Additionally, the Gulf of Maine boundary dispute was settled under
the idea of a "single maritime boundary" which divided up the sea as
well as the seabed. For these reasons, it is necessary to explore the
present legislation surrounding the delimitation of the seabed.
Dixon entrance is an extremely deep indentation in the coast with
its 200 meter depth line (which is considered to be the edge of the
4 Nancy Latham, "Century-old Alaska/B.C. border dispute still unresolved,"
National Fishennan, April 1982, p. 29.
5 Barry G. Buzan and Danford W. Middlemiss, "Canadian Foreign Policy and the
Exploitation of the Seabed," in Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea,
ed. Barbara Johnson and Mark W. Zacher (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1977), p. 43.
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continental shelf) no more than 27-28 miles from shore. (See Figure
111-3) Additionally, nations may now claim out to the edge of the
continental margin. All of the remaining seabed in Dixon Entrance
that is not part of the shelf is indeed part of the continental margin.
The governing international law relating to the seabed is the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf to which both Canada
and the United States are both parties. Article 6 of the Convention
states:
"Where the continental shelf is adjacent to
the territories of two adjacent states, the
boundary of the continental shelf shall be
delimited by agreement between them. In
the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary shall be
delimited by application of the principle of
equidistance from the nearest point of the
baseline from which the territorial sea of each
state is measured. "6
Although no specific talks have taken place between the United
States and Canada concerning the continental shelf in Dixon Entrance,
the two nations would take opposing views on this rule of
6 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf
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international law. Canada would continue to assert that the A-B line
continues to apply to the subsoil as well as the land and water. The
United States would continue to assert that no special circumstances
apply and that there is no specific treaty relating to the seabed.
Therefore, the equidistant line that the United States abides by for
fisheries would also apply to the seabed in accordance with
international law.
The U.S. position is initially supported by the equidistance
principle written into the '58 Convention. Canada's claim will rely
heavily upon the Treaty of 1825 and the Proceedings of the Alaska
Boundary Tribunal. "Special circumstances," although they can be
interpreted to be many things, have, in the past, been successfully
argued where they relate to an exceptional configuration of the coast
as well as by the presence of islands or navigational channels." This
is not the case in Dixon Enterance.
C. LIVING RESOURCES
Salmon, halibut, herring, and groundfish are the largest fisheries
In the panhandle area. Because the continental shelf is so narrow,
fish resources are confined to a narrow band along the coast.
Salmon, however, travel several thousand miles, well beyond Dixon
Entrance and the two hundred mile fisheries zones claimed by the
United States and Canada. While in the open ocean , the salmon
7 Luc Cuyvers, "Maritime Boundaries: Canada vs. United States," Marine Policy
Reports, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 1979), p. 3.
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stocks intermingle so that it is impossible to tell whether they came
from American or Canadian waters. Halibut are found along the
coast and travel between the two nations' waters while the herring
and groundfish remain in roughly the same area throughout their
lifetimes. 8
Both the fishing fleets of British Columbia and Alaska are made
up primarily of smaller vessels including gillnetters, trollers, and
combination vessels. Additionally, the fleet is supplemented by a
large number of purse seiners and trawlers. The salmon industry IS
the most important fishery in the region because of its large
economic contribution as well as the cooperation required to
maintain the spawning nvers. Most of the fish that is caught in this
region is exported.?
Canadians and Americans heavily exploit each others fishery and
the question of who benefits the most is often raised. In fact, this
dispute is the principle issue behind the Dixon Entrance argument.
Canadian fishermen have even gone so far as to claim that the area
south of the A-B line and inside the fishery closing line between
Queen Charlotte Island and Cape Muzon as internal waters and that
their federal government has not pushed the Canadian case far
en ough.t v
8 Barbara Johnson, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Fisheries," in Canadian
Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, ed. Barbara Johnson and Mark W.
Zacher (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), pp. 56-57.
9 Ibid., p. 57.
10 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
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Throughout the last two decades, Canadian fishing policy has been
termed as "expansionist" although not meant directly at the United
States. The United States also exhibited expansionist tendencies
when both countries pushed foreign fishing further from their shores
in the latter half of this century. But, the two nations have also
sought to accommodate each other. In the first United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1958, Canada sought
to maintain a three nautical mile territorial sea, just as the United
States did, and extend fisheries jurisdiction out to twelve nautical
miles. Both the United States and Canada feared that a twelve
nautical mile territorial sea would interfere with the navigation and
overflight rights desired by both countries.U
At the second conference, in 1960, Canada and the Unites Sates
worked closely to produce a six mile territorial sea plus a SIX mile
fishing zone proposal. The conference and the proposal failed, so the
Canadians turned to unilateral action. In 1964, Canada passed the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act which established a territorial
sea drawn from straight baselines and a contiguous fishing zone of
nine nautical miles beyond that. Other maritime nations rejected the
Canadian legislation which led the Canadians to unilaterally declare a
twelve nautical mile territorial sea in 1970.1 2
11 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
12 Ibid., p. 53.
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After 1970, Canada and the United States both promoted much
wider fishing limits at the Seabed Committee an then at UNCLOS III.
Both countries accepted the 200 nautical mile fisheries zone of the
conference and, in 1977, both Canada and the United States
unilaterally established 200 nautical mile fisheries zones.! 3 Then, in
1988, the United States declared a twelve nautical mile territorial sea
"for international purposes only. "14
In addition to these unilateral and multilateral actions, the United
States and Canada have worked together on a number of bilateral
treaties to regulate fisheries off the Alaska and British Columbia
coasts. The 1923 Pacific Halibut Treaty was one of the first attempts
to regulate a high seas fishery. The treaty was the result of declining
halibut stocks which necessitated a bilateral conservation agreement.
The treaty called for the appointment of an International Fisheries
Commission, now known as the Pacific Halibut Commission. This
body has the power to regulate the halibut fishery in the North
Pacific Ocean.U
As with the halibut question, a bilateral agreement was necessary
to prevent the over-exploitation of salmon. British Columbia is a
prime rearing ground for all five species of salmon. Much of the fish
that spawn in the rivers of British Columbia pass through Alaskan
13 Ibid.
14 Presidential Proclamation on the Extention of the Territorial Sea, 1988 .
15 J. A. Yogis, "Canadian Fisheries and International Law," in Canadian
Perspectives on International Law and Organization, ed. ~. S~ J. MacDonald,
Gerald L. Morris, and Douglas M. Johnston (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1974), p. 399.
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waters on the way to and from their spawning grounds. Valuable
stocks of pink, chum, and sockeye salmon headed for the Skeena and
Nass rivers (British Columbia) are intercepted by American
gillnetters and seiners. The problem is not "one-way" however, as
Canadian vessels intercept chinook and coho salmon off the Queen
Charlotte Islands that are destined for Washington and Oregon. For
these reasons, Pacific Salmon Interception Talks are on going In the
Alaska-British Columbia area In an attempt to allocate these valuable
stocks of fish to each nation.l v
The third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
although it has not been signed by either the United States or
Canada, contains provisions from which these two nations established
their exclusive fisheries zones. In addition, both nations treat the
majority of the Convention as "declaratory of customary international
law" (with the exception of some of the seabed provisions). Article
74 of the 1982 Convention states:
"The delimitation of the exclusive
economic zone between states with opposite
or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international
law...in order to achieve an equitable
solution." 17
16 Terry Johnson, "U.S./Canada Salmon-Interception Talks Falter," National
Fisherman, July 1981, p. 12.
17 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Article 74)
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A similar statement IS found in Article 83 of the Convention dealing
with the continental shelf. This is a drastic change from the 1980
draft of the Convention which included phrases referring to an
equidistant line excepted by special circumstances. This change In
the wording of boundary delimitations can be used to the benefit of
either nation as we will see in the next section.
D. SUMMARY
This small expanse of water between Alaska and British Columbia
serves many purposes. It is a waterway for vessels, people, and fish
and is possibly a deposit for rich mineral resources. The issues at
stake may involve 'national security, non-living resources, and living
resources. Both nations assert overlapping claims and many conflicts
have arisen as a result. Yet, a number of bilateral agreements have
served to quell the disputes and provide for a more equitable
solution. In the next section, we will examine the positions of the
two nations.
42
PART IV
POSITIONS OF THE DISPUTING NATIONS
Before a full analysis of the case can be completed, a review of
the positions of the disputing nations is necessary to establish the
baseline arguments. Both the Canadian and U.S. claims have valid
points. However, an in depth view of what concessions have been
made, what historical applications exist, and how either nation may
have acquiesced may assist us in developing an appropriate solution.
A. THE CANADIAN CLAIM
Canada has continued to assert that the A-B line is the
international boundary between the United Sates and Canada In the
Dixon Entrance. The following items, reviewed in detail, support the
Canadian claim.
The Canadians, by virtue of being subjects of the British Crown,
are, IpSO facto, party to the 1825 Treaty between Great Britain and
Russia. Although this Treaty did not define a "maritime boundary," it
did allow for a ten year concession for navigation to Great Britain as
well as a right to "forever enjoy free navigation of all rivers and
streams which, in their course towards the Pacific Ocean, may cross
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the line of demarcation "between the territories of Russia and Great
Britain. "
In 1903, the Alaska Boundary Tribunal was asked to interpret the
boundary laid down by the Treaty of 1825. Although the Americans
believe the A-B line was purely meant as a land definition, the
Canadians treat this as a border of land an d water. The use of the
54°-40'N latitude line between Cape Muzon (A) and the entrance of
Portland Channel (B) was by no accident at that particular latitude.
This parallel was maintained by the Russians as their southern
boundary line. In fact, once the U.S. - Russian ten year concession to
fish north of this line expired (in accordance with the Treaty of
1824), the United Sates warned its ships not to approach "any point
upon the Russian American coast where there is a Russian
establishment. ..nor to frequent the interior seas, gulfs, harbours, and
creeks upon that coast at any point north of the latitude of 54°-
40'N."1 This warning is proof that the United States considered this
the boundary between the Russian and American territories. Placing
the Canadians in the shoes of the Americans is a strong case for the
A-B line to stand as both a land and water boundary. The Alaska
Boundary Tribunal used these practices as a method for determining
the line, thus supporting the Canadian's claim.
1 Appendix to the Case of the United States before the Tribunal Convened at
London under the Provisions of the Treaty between the United States of
America and Great Britain concluded January 24. 1903, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1903) cited in C. B. Bourne and D. M. McRae,
"Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-
Examined," Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1976. p. 198.
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The incidents between the U.S. fishing vessels and the Canadian
fisheries protection vessels in 1897 and 1909 (mentioned
previously) are evidence of Canada's early assertion of jurisdiction in
the waters of Dixon Entrance both before and after the Alaska
Boundary Tribunal Proceedings. The first incident, although
protested by the United States was not countered by the British
Government (a fact that the Canadians can hardly be held
responsible for). The second incident was upheld by the Canadian
Privy Council as being within the jurisdiction of Canada. Although
the British and th Americans did not agree with the Canadian claim,
the Canadians had made their statement.s
Presently, U.S. and Canadian law enforcement vessels operate In
what is often referred to as a "gentlemen's agreement" or a "joint
enforcement effort. "3 A number of vessels have been seized to the
north of the A-B line by the U.S. Coast Guard, but the U.S.
government has allowed Canada to fish north up to the line. The
United States, it can be argued, has acquiesced to the Canadian claim.
Canadian navigation charts do not recognize the U.S. fishing
boundary (the equidistant line) but rather assert the position of the
government as to the A-B line. Canadian aeronautical charts also
2 Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska
Boundary Re-Examined," pp. 176-177.
3 Interview with Commander R. L. Nelson, United States Coast Guard, Assistant
to the United States Attorney, Anchorage, Alaska, 16 March 1990 and
Lieutenant J. A. Watson, United States Coast, Office of Law Enforcement,
Seventeenth Coast Guard District, Juneau, Alaska, 6 March 1990.
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draw the international boundary for airspace at the A-B Iine .« (See
Appendix I) Surprisingly enough, U.S. aeronautical charts, published
by NOAA, also seem to acknowledge the A-B line as the international
boundary between the United States and Canada.> (See Appendix
II) For sure, the airspace above the disputed waters of Dixon
Entrance are very definitely in Canadian control. The Canadian
viewpointis clearly that the international boundary between the
United States and Canada in the air, on the water, and underneath
the water is the A-B line.
Canada also believes that they have a strong case for the A-B line
under existing international law. The 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf allows for "special circumstances" to justify a
boundary other than the median line.s The 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea also allows for "historic title or other special
circumstances" to nullify the equidistant line.? Additionally, Dixon
Entrance is an important fishing ground for salmon bound for the
Canadian Skeena and Nass Rivers. Canada feels that Canadian
regulation of the area, under UNCLOS III, is the only way to manage
these stocks in cooperation with their interior fish spawning
prograrns.f
4 Kitimat VFR Nayigation Chart, 2nd edition (Ottawa: Canadian Department of
Energy, Mines, and Resources, 1987).
5 Ketchikan Sectional Aeronautical Chart, 29th edition, (Washington: U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1989)
6 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, (Article 6)
7 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, (Article 12)
8 Parzival Copes, "British Columbia fisheries and the 200-mile limit," Marine
Policy, July 1980, p. 210.
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Through treaty, historic rights, and acquiescence, Canada has a
strong claim for the A-B to stand as the international boundary.
Why haven't they pressed for a resolution? I believe that, after not
being supported by Great Britain for a good part of the history of the
dispute, Canada does not want to lose face to another world power.
What does Canada have to lose by remaining with the status quo?
They will continue to have disgruntled fishermen and must work at a
joint management plan for the salmon stocks.
B. THE AMERICAN CLAIM
The Americans have protested the Canadian claim of a "maritime
A-B line since its inception. Both of the early fisheries incidents
(mentioned previously) were protested by the United States before
and after the Alaska Boundary Tribunal completed its proceedings.
The proceedings of the tribunal were held by the British law officers
as not being of a maritime nature as the tribunal would have made it
clear that their findings were contrary to international law. In fact,
C.B. Bourne and D.M. McRae [in their article "Maritime Jurisdiction in
the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-Examined"] concluded
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the A-B line to be a
conclusive maritime boundary.?
9 Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska
Boundary Re-Examined,", p. 220.
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The United States also has a strong claim in the acquiescence of
the Canadians in the disputed area. Canada has allowed U.S. fishing
vessels in the disputed area under flag state enforcement. U.S.
navigation charts (See chart No. 177420, for example) do not
recognize the A-B line but rather extend U.S. fisheries jurisdiction to
the equidistant line.Iv Additionally, the U.S. Coast Pilot, which lists
directions and instructions that can not be adequately displayed on
charts, makes no mention of a disputed fishing area or a territorial
sea other than that claimed by the United States 11 The
unsuspecting mariner, relying on this information, might proceed
through the area as though no dispute existed.
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf (Article 6) calls for
a median line to be drawn in the absence of any agreement. In the
American view, the Hay-Herbert Treaty and the resulting Alaska
Boundary Tribunal are not an agreement over the seabed. There are
no special anomalies in the seabed that would call for the line to be
moved closer to either side. The continental slope is roughly
equivalent as it extends from the continent throughout Dixon
Entrance. Therefore, the median line should prevail, in the American
viewpoint, in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf.
10 U.S. Marine Navigation Chart no. 17420, (Washington: U. S. Department of
Commerce, 1985).
11 U. S. Coast Pilot, Vol. 8, 25th Edition, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1989).
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The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention (Article 12) calls for an
equidistant line between adjacent and opposite states. Since Dixon
Entrance is greater than 24 miles wide, this convention does not
apply directly. However, the U.S. position would be to argue that this
convention at least allows the United States to claim a territorial sea
around Dall Island and Prince of Wales Island where the Canadians
have attempted to deny the U.S. of its territorial seas. Since both
nations claim a territorial sea of twelve miles (although the
Canadians' is drawn from straight baselines) both nations should be
allowed to claim their territorial sea as far as the geography allows.
UNCLOS III provides for boundary delimitation for the exclusive
economic zone as well as the continental shelf to be based upon
"equitable principles."12 In the American view, these "equitable
principles" equate to "equidistance" as it was used in the 1980 draft
of the Convention. Historically, the U.S. could claim it had just as
much right to fish and trade throughout the waters of Dixon Entrance
as the Canadians. After all, the "sphere of influence" to the south was
American before it was Canadian. Although the United States is not a
party to UNCLOS III, it considers the Convention to be declaratory of
emerging customary law (with the exception of certain provisions
relating to the seabed).
As to fisheries management, the groundfish and halibut fisheries
are evenly distributed throughout Dixon Entrance with little
12 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Articles 74 and 83).
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movement towards one side or the other. The salmon Issue IS the
spearhead of the dispute due to the stock movements and the
significantly greater economic demand. In the American view, the
Canadians are attempting to control the entire fishery. Salmon,
however, travel much further than Dixon Entrance. They are indeed
subject to interception by vessels other than Canadian or American
orrgm when they penetrate the 200 miles offshore boundary.U No
matter where the boundary line is drawn in Dixon Entrance,
Canadian and American cooperation must continue if both nations
are to adequately manage this valuable resource.
C. SUMMARY
Both the Canadians and Americans have valid claims to the
waters of Dixon Entrance. These claims are based on historical rights,
treaty, international law, and practice. The alternatives available to
the two nations will be presented in Part V.
13 Barbara Johnson, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Fisheries," Canadian
Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, ed. Barbara Johnson and Mark W.
Zacher (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), p. 56.
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PART V
ALTERNATIVES
A number of alternatives are available to the United States and
Canada in the resolution of the Dixon Entrance boundary dispute. No
solution will ever completely please both nations. Therefore, a
compromise is in order. I intend to review the alternatives available
throughout the spectrum giving weight to each side's claim.
A. NO RESOLUTION
The maintenance of the status quo is one option for Dixon
Entrance. The boundary dispute has gone on at least since 1903 and
the disputing countries show no sign of reaching an agreement. The
number of people impacted is small, as is the economic gain
presently derived. The greatest difficulty lies in the frustration of
the fishermen. As one Canadian fisherman put it, "We've all fished
back and forth over the line for as long as I can remember. We fish
and we yack on the radio about our regulations and gear. Its all very
friendly. But there's always some yahoo who will radio his coast
guard to say someone is fishing in his waters and that's when it all
gets nasty." 1
1 Nancy Latham, "Century -old Alaska/B.C. border dispute still unresolved," p.
29.
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The frustration level is high and a number of vessels are seized
each year by Canadian and U.S. Coast Guards for fishing too far south
or north. Fishermen on both sides attempt to push the line as a
result of the frustration they feel in competing with each other in the
disputed zone. Already beleaguered by high interest rates, ever
increasing gas prices, and declining catches, there is still the
uncertainty of fishing in a disputed area.? On July 5, 1989, two
Canadian fishing vessels, the FN Viscount and the FIV Fonzie, were
seized by the U.S. Coast Guard for salmon fishing west of Cape Muzon.
The problem here relates to how the A-B line is extended offshore,
yet another problem resulting from the disputed area. Their catch
was sold, the vessels seized, and the trial will be held in the summer
of 1990.3 The frustration continues.
B. JOINT MANAGEMENT AREA
A joint management area or "dual sovereignty" area IS another
possible solution to the dispute. This would work well in the area of
fisheries as it would allow for better management of the fish stocks.
In a sense, the Pacific Halibut Commission and the Pacific Salmon
Interception Talks already provide the framework for such a
management scheme. These organizations could be used as a
springboard for the joint ownership of the waters of Dixon Entrance.
2 Ibid.
3 Interview with Commander R. L. Nelson. United States Coast Guard. Assistant
to the U.S. Attorney. Anchorage. Alaska, 16 March 1990.
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On the other hand, sovereignty is difficult to "share." Present
relations between the United States and Canada are good and,
although there is some conflict in Dixon Entrance, the present system
of dual enforcement seems to work. But what would happen if
Canada and the United States were to become at odds with each
other? The dual sovereignty area would come under dispute again
and another solution would have to be reached. The same would
happen if another more profitable resource, like oil, were found In
the area. A joint management plan would work for the present but
would crumble should new economic or security issues be raised.
C. THE A-B LINE
A solution in favor of the A-B line is the hope of the Canadian
government. They feel that they have a strong historic case behind
the 54°-40'N parallel as drawn by the Alaska Boundary Tribunal
upon interpretation of the Treaty of 1825. Parzival Copes [in his
article "British Columbia Fisheries and the 200-Mile Limit] speculates
that the U.S. in fact considers that Canada does have a strong case In
international law with respect to the A-B line.s This may be a
reason that the issue has yet to go before arbitration.
A review of the American claim, however, may mitigate the
Canadian view. Specifically, Canada has acquiesced somewhat to the
4 Parzival Copes. "British Columbia fisheries and the 200-mile limit." p. 210.
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equidistant line by allowing the American vessels to fish that far
south. I do not foresee a resolution strictly in favor of the A-B line.
D. EQUIDISTANCE
The United States has a strong case through the existing
international law for the use of the equidistant line. However,
UNCLOS III (1982) has modified the language somewhat since the
draft of 1980 to take out the more specific "median" line and replace
it with the less specific "equitable principles" to settle the boundary
disputes. This factor, combined with the strong Canadian claim for
the A-B line would. definitely not favor a strict ruling for the
equidistant line. In my opinion, both the United States and Canada
will have to give somewhat in order to reach an "equitable" solution.
E. AN AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SEA
The United States is particularly interested In gaining a strip of
water in the disputed area adjacent to the U.S. coast so that its
vessels may pass unimpeded to the south of Cape Muzon and Prince
of Wales Island. This would allow U.S. access to Clarence Strait,
Revillagigedo Channel, and the city of Ketchikan from the south.
Coincidentally, a twelve mile territorial sea, which the United States
and Canada both claim, would also allow the United States to claim
the valuable groundfisheries along the northern portion of the
Continental Shelf in Dixon Entrance.
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This solution is somewhat of a concession, albeit slight, on the part
of the Americans. However, the Canadians could be expected to
vehemently oppose this solution because, although they gam some
additional water space and part of the continental slope, they do not
gain much of the continental shelf and its associated resources.
F. SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE
On the surface, "splitting the difference" appears to be an
equitable solution. The Canadians gain more water and seabed than
the equidistance or territorial sea methods. The United States gains a
navigable waterway around the south end of Cape Muzon and Prince
of Wales Island as well as a portion of the seabed. In dividing the
disputed area between the two nations, I would give the unclaimed
area to the Canadians and draw a line through the disputed area m a
way that would divide the territory appropriately and allow for an
American waterway. (See Figure V-I)
In my opinion, this is the best solution available to the disputing
nations. Both nations stand equally when the issue is approached
from the vantage point of natural prolongation of the coast,
proportionality to the length of the coastline, and unity of the seabed.
The only issues this dispute truly hinges on is the conduct of the two
parties with respect to the Treaties of 1824 and 1825, as well as the
proceedings of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal. Both nations show a
history of use that would allow a "split the difference" solution to be
appropriate.
. 55
oPacIfIC
Ouon
..'-~-~::::""'-;:'J ~::.:~
--- Apptolt USdOwn
-APl)t'OIl Ca1odoon .
-· '- Clalm ."
, ."~ .-....~ .....--..
' r-; --,
,1#. - 200 metre dep1h
Fi gure V- 1 (Source: Copes, "Brit ish Col urnbi e fi sheri es find the 200-
mil eli mit" division line added)
56
G. SUMMARY
There are a number of options available to the potential arbiter.
The solution hinges not on proportionality, geography, or coastline.
It is a matter of interpretation of the applicable treaties and
international law. It is then modified with respect to the conduct of
the parties, namely through acquiescence. In their article "Maritime
Jurisdiction In the Dixon Entrance: the Alaska Boundary Re-
Examined," C. B. Bourne and D. M. McRae stated that, after a review of
the Treaties of 1824, 1825 and the Alaska Boundary Tribunal
Proceedings, "there is sufficient evidence to make both (the United
States and Canadian) claims, but insufficient evidence to make either
claim conclusive. "5
I believe that an equal division of the disputed area is the best
solution available.But, regardless of the outcome, a joint management
of the salmon fisheries is still necessary to maintain the stocks of this
economically beneficial resource.
5 Bourne and Mclcae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska
Boundary Re-Examined," p. 220.
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PART VI
CONCLUSION
The waters of Dixon Entrance have been the home and pathway of
Russians, Americans, British, and Canadians for over 200 years. In a
series of agreements between the respective nations, disagreement
arose. The result is a thorn in the side of Canada and the United
States along their North Pacific boundary.
Canada, believing that the A-B line drawn by the Alaska
Boundary Tribunal in 1903 was a maritime boundary, has claimed,
for nearly a hundred years, rights to the waters of Dixon Entrance up
to the 54 0 -40'N parallel. The United States, on the other hand,
believes that the A-B line was merely meant to allocate land
territory, not water. The United States believes that the equidistant
line between the two nations is the appropriate boundary.
The result is a disputed area of questionable jurisdiction in Dixon
Entrance between the equidistant line and the A-B line. The greatest
conflict in this area lies over the living resources that inhabit these
waters, namely salmon, halibut, and groundfish. Although security
and non-living resource issues have not appeared, their potential for
escalating the conflict loom just over the horizon.
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If the Dixon Entrance boundary dispute is not settled in this era of
fisheries conflict, what will come of relations between Canada and
the United States should oil be discovered beneath these waters? My
guess is that if the issue is not resolved now, it will certainly escalate
over oil resources.
I have proposed a solution based on dividing the disputed area
equally between the two nations. In any event, fish stocks must be
jointly managed by both countries no matter what the outcome.
Although I may be accused of "selling out" to one side or the other
just as Lord Alverstone was, I feel that some concessions must be
made by both sides.
The boundary in Dixon Entrance is one of four external maritime
boundaries between Canada and the United States. Only one, in the
Gulf of Maine, has been settled. That case has set the standard by
which we should settle the remaining boundaries. Only an
"equitable" solution can be expected to keep relations between
Canada and the United States on solid ground. Let's settle this
dispute once and for all in order that we may move on to the greater
issues of resource cooperation and management.
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